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ABSTRACT
Multiple initiatives propose utilizing Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE)
advertisements for contact tracing and SARS-CoV-2 exposure noti-
fications. This demo shows a research tool to analyze BLE adver-
tisements; if universally enabled by the vendors, the uncovered
features could improve exposure notifications for everyone. We
reverse-engineer the firmware-internal implementation of BLE ad-
vertisements on Broadcom and Cypress chips and show how to
extract further physical-layer information at the receiver. The ana-
lyzed firmware works on hundreds of millions of devices, such as
all iPhones, the European Samsung Galaxy S series, and Raspberry
Pis.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Security and privacy → Systems security; Software secu-
rity engineering; Software reverse engineering; • Networks →
Application layer protocols.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Specification-compliant BLE advertisements contain little informa-
tion that can be used for proximity estimation. We assume that
the Apple and Google exposure notification Application Program-
ming Interface (API) uses advertisements nonetheless [2], because
they preserve battery and limit Remote Code Execution (RCE) risks.
When receiving an advertisement, the chip measures the Received
Signal Strength Indicator (RSSI) and includes it in the advertisement
report before forwarding it to the operating system. This behavior
is specification-compliant and does not need any further modifica-
tions [1, p. 2382]. There are multiple ways to enhance proximity
measurements. For example, one could include the senderâĂŹs
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transmission power in the advertisements [2, p. 4]. The transmis-
sion power directly influences the RSSI on the receiver. Not all
chips can be set to the same transmission power, and thus, RSSI
measurements need to be adjusted on the receiver.
We find that Apple’s Bluetooth PacketLogger goes beyond the
Bluetooth specification and displays the channel, antenna, and scan
mode of each advertisement—but this information is always set to
zero. Further investigation reveals that this information can be en-
abled with a firmware-internal global variable. As shown in Figure 1,
the advertisements are not modified, as the information is measured
on the receiver. In the most recent version of InternalBlue [3], this
feature can be activated with the adv command.
Information about the advertisement channel is valuable, as the
RSSI varies depending on the channel. The three advertisement
channels are spread across the spectrum. Thus, typical interference
sources such as a Wi-Fi access point can easily be evaded by black-
listing the interfered channel without taking statistics on multiple
advertisements over time.
This demo is structured as follows. We explain the detailed
reverse-engineering workflow to uncover proprietary features in
Section 2. In Section 3, we conclude our findings.
2 REVERSE-ENGINEERING PROPRIETARY
ADVERTISEMENT FEATURES
We use two methods to reverse-engineer vendor-specific additions
to the BLE advertisement handler. First, we analyze which informa-
tion the PacketLogger is using to display the channel in Section 2.1.
Based on this information, we analyze the Broadcom and Cypress
firmware to enable the output of this information in Section 2.2.
2.1 PacketLogger
The PacketLogger is included in the Additional Tools for Xcode on
macOS. It features similar functions as Wireshark but is specifically
designed for Bluetooth in the Apple ecosystem. Thus, it supports
various proprietary protocols and features that are a helpful start-
ing point for reverse-engineering. These protocols are otherwise
InternalBlue
BLE Advertisement
Optional: TX Power
PHY Channel: 37..39
Figure 1: BLE advertisement physical-layer information.
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Table 1: BLE advertisement report captured with PacketLogger, including the enhanced event type.
Apr 15 17:19:28:281 HCI Event CA:FE:BA:BE:13:37 ▼ LE - Advertising Report - 1 Report - Normal - Random - CA:FE:BA:BE:13:37
-56 dBm - Channel 37
Parameter Length: 30 (0x1E)
Num Reports: 0x01
Report 0
Event Type: Scan Mode: Normal Scan Mode - Channel 37 - Antenna: BT
- Connectable Undirected Advertising (ADV_IND)
...
RSSI: -56 dBm
Apr 15 17:19:28:281 HCI Event ▶ 00000000: 3E1E 0201 0001 3713 BEBA FECA ...
channel = (event_type >> 4) & 7
antenna = event_type & 0x80
scan_mode = (event_type >> 3) & 3
Listing 1: Enhanced event type interpretation.
undocumented. We assume that Apple uses the PacketLogger for de-
veloping protocols and debugging and, thus, intentionally includes
information about these protocols in their toolchain.
Table 1 shows a BLE advertisement as captured onmacOSCatalina
with PacketLogger. Note that by default all advertisements are dis-
played to be on channel 37, even though they are also received on
channels 38 and 39. However, this indicates that there are some
means of channel interpretation that are not included in specification-
compliant advertisement reports [1, p. 2382].
The PacketLogger binary is located in PacketLogger.app/Cont
ents/Frameworks/PacketDecoder.framework/Versions/A/Pac
ketDecoder. It contains all the strings displayed within the Packet-
Logger and also most function names, which enables an analysis
with IDA Pro 7.2. A search for the string ‘Channel’, as it can be
seen in the PacketLogger output, leads to the function leAdvert
isingEventTypeString. This function prints the antenna, chan-
nel, and scan mode, which are encoded into the upper half byte of
the event type as shown in Listing 1. This is possible because the
event type is 1 B, but Bluetooth specification only defines the values
0x00–0x04 [1, p. 2383]. The channel values 0x0–0x2 correspond to
the Bluetooth channels 37–39. Thus, without this feature enabled
on the chip, the channel is always interpreted as 37 by PacketLogger.
Note that the Bluetooth specification defines an extended adver-
tisement report [1, p. 2402]. However, this report type also does not
contain channel information.
2.2 Bluetooth Firmware
The PacketLogger reverse-engineering only indicates that additional
event types exist. They still need to be enabled within the firmware.
For the firmware analysis, we dump firmware from a selection of
chips with InternalBlue. WICED Studio 6.2 contains partial symbols
for various Cypress chips as well as the Broadcom BCM20703A2 chip
that is in MacBooks produced in 2016 and 2017.
The global boolean bEnhancedAdvReport changes the behavior
of the functions _scanTaskRxHeaderDone and lculp_HandleSc
anReport. This is explained in the next two paragraphs.
The firmware is organized in tasks that are called by the Blue-
tooth Core Scheduler (BCS). The scan task is responsible for receiv-
ing advertisements. In general, packet reception tasks are separated
into receiving a header and receiving the according payload. The
channel is already known when receiving a header, and thus, if
bEnhancedAdvReport is set, additional information is copied from
the raw packet data into ulp_extraInfo.
While tasks need to be finished within the strict timings of the
Bluetooth clock, handlers asynchronously parse task data and pass
it on to the host’s operating system driver. In the case of an advertise-
ment, this handler is lculp_HandleScanReport. The prefix lculp
stands for link control in the ultra-low-power protocol, namely BLE.
The advertisement handler copies the additional information into
the event_type field if bEnhancedAdvReport is set.
Searching for the variable name bEnhancedAdvReport is only
possible within a firmware that has partial symbols. However, sym-
bols for most off-the-shelf devices are unknown. Nonetheless, hard-
ware registers are mapped similarly over various firmware gener-
ations. Also, the architecture is typically an ARM Cortex M, and
compiler options are similar. Thus, we can search for equal 4 B and
8 B snippets, which only return a few results within each firmware,
to identify the scan task handler across multiple firmware versions.
In our case, the scan task handler disassembly includes the line
mov.w r0, #0x650000, which is a 4 B instruction represented by
0x00caf44f, and that we used for manual binary diffing.
We find that the comparably old Nexus 5 firmware with a build
date from 2012 does not feature the bEnhancedAdvReport flag.
However, the Cypress evaluation boards CYW20719, CYW20735,
and CYW20819 support it, as well as the MacBook 2016–2017 chip
BCM20703A2, the MacBook 2017–2019 chip BCM4364B0, and the
Samsung Galaxy S10/S20 chip BCM4375B1. We assume that this
feature was introduced by Broadcom around 2014 and all newer
chips support it. While our InternalBlue-based setup can only enable
this feature for research, Broadcom could also roll it out as a patch
for a broad variety of devices.
3 CONCLUSION
The channel reporting within BLE advertisements can be enabled
with a single flag on most Broadcom and Cypress chips. This makes
the patch rather simple, as it only needs to set the flag to 0x01.
Future practical tests within contact tracing will show how much
channel awareness can improve proximity measurements. Further
physical-layer properties might also be available during advertise-
ment reception. However, we did not spot any additional adver-
tisement flags during the reverse-engineering process. Thus, more
complex patches are required for further physical-layer insights.
DEMO: Extracting Physical-Layer BLE Advertisement Information from Broadcom and Cypress Chips WiSec ’20, July 8–10, 2020, Linz (Virtual Event), Austria
DEMO
This demo consists of an InternalBlue addition that enables the
enhanced event type within advertisements on various Broadcom
and Cypress chips. InternalBlue runs on Android, Linux, macOS, and
iOS. Thus, the demo can be tested on various devices, as long as
they have a supported chip.
InternalBlue is open-source and available on https://github.com/
seemoo-lab/internalblue. The extended advertisements can be acti-
vated by running the command adv. After enabling the enhanced
advertisements with adv and opening Wireshark, the event type
field in advertisements contains the masked channel, antenna, and
scan mode information.
To show this demo, we will provide a video of receiving the
enhanced event type on a Cypress CYW20819 evaluation board on
Linux. On the Linux BlueZ stack, advertisements can be received
by executing hcitool lescan.
Moreover, the video will show the workflow of reverse-engineer-
ing PacketLogger to identify the field where the channel information
is included, as depicted in Figure 2. Then, we will search for this
field in a partially symbolized Cypress firmware. This part of the
demo will help other researchers to identify similar proprietary
features.
Figure 2: PacketLogger analysis in IDA Pro 7.2.
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